Title: XCloner Backup Plugin v3.1.1 (Wordpress) v3.5.1 (Joomla!) Vulnerabilities |
Author: Larry W. Cashdollar, @_larry0 |
Date: 2014-10-17 |
CVE-ID:[CVE-2014-8603][CVE-2014-8604][CVE-2014-8605][CVE-2014-8606][CVE-2014-8607] |
CWE: CWE-20 Input Validation |
Download Site: https://wordpress.org/plugins/xcloner-backup-and-restore/ http://extensions.joomla.org/extensions/access-a-security/site-security/backup/665 |
Vendor: http://www.xcloner.com |
Vendor Notified: 2014-10-17 |
Vendor Contact: Ovidiu Liuta, @thinkovi Acknowledged & no other response |
Advisory: http://www.vapid.dhs.org/advisories/wordpress/plugins/Xcloner-v3.1.1/ |
Description: XCloner is a Backup and Restore component designed for PHP/Mysql websites, it can work as a native plugin for WordPress and Joomla!. |
Vulnerability: There are multiple vulnerabilities I’ve discovered in this plugin, they are as follows.
Arbitrary command execution:
Clear text MySQL password exposure through html text box under configuration panel.
Database backups exposed to local users due to open file permissions.
Unauthenticated remote access to backup files via easily guessable file names.
Authenticated remote file access.
MySQL password exposed to process table:
Arbitrary Command Execution
Plugin allows arbitrary commands to be executed by an authenticated user. The user will require administrative access rights to backup the database. User input when specifying your own file name is not sanitized as well as various other input fields.
All user configurable variables are vulnerable, these variables need to be sanitized before being passed to the exec() function for execution.
$_CONFIG[tarpath]
$exclude
$_CONFIG['tarcompress']
$_CONFIG['filename']
$_CONFIG['exfile_tar']
$_CONFIG[sqldump]
$_CONFIG['mysql_host']
$_CONFIG['mysql_pass']
$_CONFIG['mysql_user']
$database_name
$sqlfile
$filename
Vulnerable code
./cloner.functions.php:
1672 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " $exclude -c" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename ./administrator/backups/index.html");
1673 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/database-sql.sql");
1674 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/htaccess.txt");
1675 exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/perm.txt");
1695- if ($_REQUEST[cron_dbonly] != 1) {
1696: exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " $excl_cmd " . " -X " . $_CONFIG['exfile_tar'] . " -chv" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "f $filename ./");
1697- } else {
1698-
1699-
1700: exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "cvf $filename ./administrator/backups/database-sql.sql");
1701-
1702- if (is_array($databases_incl)) {
1703- foreach ($databases_incl as $database_name)
1704- if ($database_name != "") {
1705: exec($_CONFIG[tarpath] . " -" . $_CONFIG['tarcompress'] . "vf $filename --update ./administrator/backups/" . $database_name . "-sql.sql");
1706- }
1707- }
1708- }
--
1873- {
1874- //$sizeInBytes = filesize($path);
1875- $sizeInBytes = sprintf("%u", filesize($path));
1876: if ((!$sizeInBytes) and (function_exists("exec"))){
1877- $command = "ls -l \"$path\" | cut -d \" \" -f 5";
1878: $sizeInBytes = @exec($command);
1879- }
2010- if ($_CONFIG['sql_mem']) {
2011: exec($_CONFIG[sqldump] . " -h " . $_CONFIG['mysql_host'] . " -u " . $_CONFIG['mysql_user'] . " -p" . $_CONFIG['mysql_pass'] . " " . $dbname . " > " . $sqlfile . " $drop --allow-k
eywords " . $ex_dump);
2012-
2013- if (get_filesize($sqlfile) > 0)
2014- $databaseResult = LM_DATABASE_BACKUP_COMPLETED . ' ( ' . getFileSizeText(get_filesize($sqlfile)) . ' )';
2015- else
2016- $databaseResult = LM_MSG_BACK_14;
2017-
2018: exec("chmod 777 $sqlfile");
2019-
2020- return $sqlfile;
2021- }
./classes/fileRecursion.php
339- public static function getFileSize($file){
340-
341- $sizeInBytes = sprintf("%u", filesize($file));
342: if ((!$sizeInBytes) and (function_exists("exec"))){
343- $command = "ls -l \"$file\" | cut -d \" \" -f 5";
344: $sizeInBytes = @exec($command);
345- }
346-
347- return $sizeInBytes;
./restore/XCloner.php
290- }else{
291- if($ext == '.tgz') $compress = 'z';
292- else $compress = '';
293: shell_exec("tar -x".$compress."pf $file -C $_CONFIG[output_path]");
294- }
295-}
1077- if($_REQUEST['use_mysqldump'] == 1){
1078: echo shell_exec($_REQUEST['mysqldump_path']." -u ".$_REQUEST[mysql_username]." -p".$_REQUEST[mysql_pass]." -h ".$_REQUEST[mysql_server]." ".$_REQUEST[mysql_db]." < ".$sqlfile);
1079- return;
1080- }
Clear Text MySQL Database Password
The plugin also returns the MySQL clear text password via html text box back to the user in the configuration panel. A password should never be repeated back to you in clear text. The plugin will happily send this over a clear text connection.
Remote Database Download & Local File Permissions
The default recommend path for backup storage is /usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups.
An index.html file is created under this directory to prevent casual browsing however the file names are easily predictable. From the installation instructions:
“XCloner is a tool that will help you manage your website backups, generate/restore/move so your website will be always secured! With XCloner you will be able to clone your site to any other location with just a few clicks. Don't forget to create the 'administrator/backups' directory in your Wordpress root and make it fully writeable.”
The format of the filenames are: backup_year-month-day_month_24hour_minute_domainname-sql-OPTIONS.tar where
OPTIONS could be either -sql-drop, -sql-nodrop or -nosql depending on options selected during time of backup.
The domain name is set by the HTTP_HOST header from line 88 of cloner.config.php:
88: $_CONFIG['mosConfig_live_site']=$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'];
root@larry:/usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups# ls -l
total 129432
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 44177408 Oct 29 13:15 backup_2014-10-29_10-14_testsite-sql-nodrop.tar
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 44177408 Oct 29 13:19 backup_2014-10-29_10-19_testsite-sql-nodrop.tar
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 44177408 Oct 29 13:24 backup_2014-10-29_10-24_testsite-sql-nodrop.tar
These file permissions also expose the contents of the databases to any local system users.
File naming convention code is as follows:
1327 $domainname = $_CONFIG['mosConfig_live_site'];
1351 if ($_REQUEST['bname'] == "") {
1352 if ($backupDatabase == 1) {
1353 if ($_REQUEST['dbbackup_drop']) {
1354 $filename1 = 'backup_' . date("Y-m-d_H-i") . '_' . $domainname . '-sql-drop' . $f_ext;
1355 } else {
1356
1357 $filename1 = 'backup_' . date("Y-m-d_H-i") . '_' . $domainname . '-sql-nodrop' . $f_ext;
1358 }
1359 } else
1360 $filename1 = 'backup_' . date("Y-m-d_H-i") . '_' . $domainname . '-nosql' . $f_ext;
1361 } else {
I’ve found a few vulnerable websites with the google dork:
https://www.google.com/#q=inurl:+administrator%2Fbackups
Remote File Access
The user has to have administrative rights, but the backup downloader doesn’t check the path
for ../.
http://192.168.0.33/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=json_return&page=xcloner_show&option=com_cloner&task=download&file=../../../../etc/passwd
Will download /etc/passwd off the remote system.
MySQL Database Password Exposed to Process Table
lwc@wordpress:/etc/wordpress$ while (true); do ps -ef |grep [m]ysqldump; done
www-data 16691 8889 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 sh -c mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -pPASSWORDHERE wordpress > /usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups/database-sql.sql --allow-keywords
www-data 16692 16691 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -px xxxxxx wordpress --allow-keywords
www-data 16691 8889 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 sh -c mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -ps3cur1ty wordpress > /usr/share/wordpress/administrator/backups/database-sql.sql --allow-keywords
www-data 16692 16691 0 09:27 ? 00:00:00 mysqldump --quote-names -h localhost -u root -px xxxxxx wordpress --allow-keywords
|
Export: JSON TEXT XML |
Exploit Code:
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Screen Shots: [image03.png][image01.png][image02.png][image00.png] |
Notes: 114176 114177 114178 114179 114180 |
Larry W. Cashdollar
Larry Cashdollar
Larry W. Cashdollar vulnerability
Larry Cashdollar advisory